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INTRODUCTION
The United States government's strategic rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region carries with it the potential to open doors to both mutually beneficial opportunities and significant concerns. Throughout the region, each government, industry and culture presents a unique and complex mix of relationships, history, competing interests and security challenges. Yet, many of these same sectors are also ripe for improved diplomatic engagement, increased foreign investment and budding strategic partnerships. From the U.S. government perspective, one could argue that few nations in Southeast Asia highlight the broad scope of opportunities and complex challenges better than Vietnam. As this paper will illustrate, the Vietnam petroleum industry is a microcosm of some of the greater national and regional issues currently faced by Vietnam.
When the Vietnam economy surged between 1995 and 2010, so did the demand for both oil and electricity.
1 Increased demand, coupled with shrinking domestic supplies, puts
Vietnam on track to become a net importer of energy sources by 2020 and one estimate predicts a three-fold increase in domestic demand for petroleum products by 2035. 2 Even with aggressive efforts by Vietnam to improve its oil exploration and production efforts,
Vietnam recognizes its increasing dependence on foreign petroleum and is actively searching for solutions in a complex competition for these essential natural resources.
PetroVietnam Oil & Gas Group (PVN) is a state-owned company, serving as the parent owner, regulator and clearinghouse for all facets of Vietnam's oil and natural gas production. 3 Foreign countries and private organizations seeking to partner with PVN, or one of its four subsidiaries, do so with the full knowledge that the partnership is with not only the company, but also the government of Vietnam. Thus, private business partnerships with a state-owned company, while not inevitably risky, adds the dimensions of diplomatic tension and regional disputes into the business equation.
PVN's pursuit of joint exploration, production and expansion opportunities are a potential double-edged sword worthy of attention from the U.S. government. On one hand, the industry provides investment opportunities for global corporations and the chance for Vietnam to work towards energy self-sufficiency. On the other hand, Vietnam's current petroleum partnerships with countries like Russia and Cuba may run counter to U.S.
interests. 4 More importantly, territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) with neighboring countries, including China, means nationalistic tensions often run high, and risk of spill-over into the petroleum exploration sector is always present. This being the case, it is essential for the United States government to understand the strategic implications of PVN's petroleum expansion initiatives, both regionally and internationally, and it should seek mutually beneficial engagement opportunities that support both U.S. and regional interests.
Background -The Vietnam Petroleum Industry
As a starting point, it is necessary to provide an overview of Vietnam's petroleum industry and its supply-demand concerns, in order to gain a better understanding of why the United States should care about this particular sector. As mentioned in the introduction, Vietnam's economic growth since the mid-1990s has created a significant demand for the nation's energy resources. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) estimates that, in the next 20 years, overall energy demand will double in Vietnam, with oil accounting for more than 50% of the total demand. 5 In addition, APEC projects that Vietnam's reliance on imported oil will begin to increase in 2014, and reach a 66% dependency rate by 2035. 6 Like with many other countries reliant on foreign sources for their energy needs, oil will increasingly become a matter of Vietnamese national security in the years ahead. Oil dependency as a national security interest is especially vital to Vietnam considering its neighbor, China, has similar issues and is not only a historic adversary, but is also the world's biggest energy consumer. 7 Faced with a growing energy challenge, Vietnam is taking deliberate steps to increase its domestic oil production and improve its self-reliance. Corporation. PVN has a monopoly on oil distribution and transmission. Joint partnerships with private companies are utilized for exploration and production, but all of these partnerships must sell the products through PVN. 9 Importantly, the revenues and taxes collected on petroleum sales account for between 20% and 30% of Vietnam's annual national budget. 10 Currently, Vietnam has 14 oil-producing fields, located mostly in the Cuu Long and Nam Con Son basin areas off the southeast coast. Prior to 2009, the country did not have its own refining capability, so it exported crude oil and imported refined products. The bureaucratic organization of the industry can be both daunting and pre-disposed 
PetroVietnam Expansion & Exploration Initiatives
After more than fifty years of exploration efforts, a substantial oil field was discovered on Vietnam's continental shelf in August of 1974. 16 Since this first significant discovery, Vietnam has continued to grow its petroleum industry through both statesponsorship and joint ventures. The current expansion efforts can be grouped into three primary categories: 1) domestic production, 2) exploration initiatives and 3) international partnerships outside of the region. Although some of these efforts are internal to Vietnam, others involve relationships that carry the potential to stir up regional and international tensions.
Within the country, PVN is attempting to expand its domestic refinement capabilities.
With the intention of boosting production at Dung Quat to 200,000 bbl/d by 2017, PVN plans to offer 49% of the refinery's equity to foreign investors. 17 Russia is reported to be interested in investing in this facility. 18 In addition, PVN will break ground on a second refinery at the end of October 2013. The $9 billion refinery, located about 180 kilometers south of Hanoi, will be a joint partnership with companies from Japan and Kuwait. Planned to be in operation by 2017, this facility is projected to produce 200,000 bbl/d. 19 In the long-term,
Vietnam is seeking to partner with foreign investors to build a total of five domestic refineries. This includes a third refinery in southern Vietnam by 2020. Although much of the unprocessed crude oil will be imported to Vietnam, the domestic refineries will lower the overall import costs and create the capability to export refined oil at a significant profit. 20 Exploration occupies a large part of PVN's current growth endeavors. However, although Vietnam has invested large amounts of money in exploration efforts, the high costs associated with these efforts has driven PVN to partner with multiple foreign companies to offset the expenses. 21 In general, the exploration efforts fall into two basic types: those in undisputed areas and those in disputed areas. As will be evident, the current partnerships and regional connections create a truly global, diverse and somewhat unpredictable mix of players.
In the undisputed areas, PVN is concentrating efforts towards the Red River delta in northern Vietnam and off the coast of central Vietnam, near Da Nang. 22 In the Da Nang area, PVN is already partnered with the U.S. oil giant Exxon Mobil (Exxon). Although Exxon announced in late 2011 that they had discovered oil in this location, the probability of commercial quantities was still being analyzed. If there are commercial quantities of oil at this site, PVN and Exxon hopes to begin drilling and producing by the end of this decade.
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PVN is still seeking partners to explore in the Red River delta region.
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It is also important to note that Russia is heavily invested in Vietnam's natural gas exploration and production projects. Although natural gas growth is outside the scope of this analysis, Russia-based Gazprom is a key exploration partner in many of the same undisputed areas where oil exploration is being conducted, which will likely strengthen Vietnam's already strong ties with Russia. 25 Within the undisputed waters, Vietnam also has joint exploration ventures in progress with companies from Italy, Korea, Singapore, China, and
France. 26 Along with the attempts to discover and produce oil within Vietnam's uncontested waters, the country is also pursuing exploration in several disputed areas of the South China China's territorial claims in the SCS even more strategically significant. 29 Within the disputed areas of the SCS, Vietnam is pursuing exploration through multiple avenues. In one particularly interesting partnership, PVN has paired with India's largest oil company in an exploration project in the SCS--one that crosses into the area claimed by China. Despite fairly low-level protests from the Chinese government, India deferred to Vietnam's sovereign territorial claim to justify the agreement. Although India is proceeding cautiously in the SCS, it is an indication that they may be willing to assert their influence to counter China's regional weight. 
Roadblocks & Ramifications
Having painted a picture of the overall Vietnamese petroleum industry, its structure, and its growth initiatives, it is imperative to understand where things could become complicated for foreign investors and hazardous for the region. There is no doubt that the territorial disputes in the SCS contribute some of the greatest sources of tension in the region.
However, along with potential conflicts over claims of sovereign territory, there are also other inter-state rivalries that require consideration.
The South China Sea encompasses roughly 3.5 million square kilometers of water with Vietnam, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei all possessing coastal territory. It contains major international sea lines of communication and a primary fishery for several countries in the region. The SCS also holds the potential for substantial amounts of oil and natural gas-key natural resources for a region with rapidly growing energy demands. 34 Along with the potential for abundant drilling, "almost a third of global crude oil and over half of global [liquid natural gas] trade passes through the South China Sea." 35 In short, maritime problems in the SCS can create regional and global impacts.
There are many pages of articles, legal analyses and reports pertaining to the territorial disputes in the SCS. The issues have long histories, are complex and have no easy
answers. As such, the purpose of this discussion is not to rehash or solve the disputes in the SCS. Instead, I will only give a top-level overview to highlight the issues germane to the petroleum industry and how they have manifested in the past few years.
In 1947, China published an official map using eleven dashed lines to indicate
Chinese territory in the SCS. The dashed lines formed a large u-shape that covered much of the SCS. Two of the dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin were later dropped and the revised ninedash line map "was subsequently adopted by the People's Republic of China." 36 The red line in Figure 2 below outlines the territory claimed in the original 9-dash line. The other lines indicate the sovereign territorial claims made by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. 37 These lines have been the root of a number of recent disputes involving Vietnam, China and the search for untapped petroleum sources. continued to work with PVN in these areas. Of note, after stepping away from contract negotiations with PVN, Chevron signed a substantial agreement with China to drill for natural gas on mainland China. 42 Although seemingly hesitant to resist Chinese aggression with counter-aggression, Vietnam has not accepted these actions against their commercial operations lying still.
Vietnam was able to expose Chinese aggression after the cable cutting incident and ignite international criticism against China. 43 In 2012, when China solicited commercial bids for exploration projects in the same disputed waters, Vietnam responded with strong diplomatic protests. 44 The duplicity of China's position does not seem to be lost on the Vietnamese people either. The diplomatic stir over the 2012 commercial bids incited demonstrations in
Vietnam to protest the Chinese actions. Even with just a top-level view of the complex issues directly related and/or tangential to the Vietnamese petroleum industry, it becomes easy to see why maritime security scholar, Sam Bateman, classifies these regional issues as "wicked problems." He fittingly argues that the highly complex issues and levels of disagreement about the problems make policy creation "highly resistant to resolution." 47 So, as the U.S. shifts focus to the Asian-Pacific region, U.S. agencies and commercial entities must do so with the realization that these problems are not going away.
Implications & Opportunities for U.S. National Interests
What does this all mean for agencies of the U.S. government? In short, the United
States needs to carefully monitor ongoing and future Vietnamese efforts to secure energy self-sufficiency-but must tread carefully. Knowing that the U.S. has a strong interest in the region, the likelihood is high that the countries bordering the SCS will use U.S. presence to leverage their own national interests. As Asian security affairs expert, Dr. David Lai asserts, for the U.S., "doing too little runs the risk of emboldening China to take tougher stands against its neighbors. But doing too much would antagonize China and encourage disputants to overplay the 'U.S. card.'" 48 The key for the U.S., therefore, is to correctly identify possible implications of increased presence, along with opportunities to bolster regional relationships without being too assertive.
Unquestionably, regional maritime security in Southeast Asia is of extremely high importance to the government of the United States. However, in the pursuit of security, the U.S. needs to be especially careful to avoid finding itself in flare-up situations where it might be asked to serve as a referee. More importantly, the U.S must avoid the temptation to overtly pick a side in these disputes. This will not be easy because as Vietnam and China bolster their petroleum exploration efforts in the SCS, the probability of more disputes is significant.
Although often hindered by their inability to gain consensus and enforce policy, some or the SCS region. While the U.S. will not be able to guarantee regional stability or quell the region's thirst for energy resources, it can take positive steps to help improve, or at least maintain, the status quo. USPACOM, acting on behalf of and in conjunction with other U.S. government agencies, can help set the conditions for stability with concerted efforts in areas that provide benefit not only to Vietnam, but the region as a whole.
CONCLUSION
While not implying that a conflict in the SCS region is inevitable, U.S. Department of Defense Policy Board member and Center for New American Security senior fellow, Robert
Kaplan, suggests that the 21 st century's major battlefield will be the SCS. 53 It remains to be seen as to whether his prediction hold true. However, historical tensions, growing economies and increased regional energy demands make national sovereignty and security issues international concerns. As posited at the beginning of this paper, Vietnam and its petroleum industry are microcosms of Southeast Asia.
PVN will continue to pursue ventures, both domestically and abroad, to secure its energy self-reliance. It is not the role of the United States, nor should it be, to assist them or protect them during these expansion ventures. In fact, as highlighted, some of PVN's partnerships are probably counter to U.S. interests. Vietnam also realizes ties with the U.S.
that become too strong will likely fuel Chinese saber-rattling and aggression. 54 This being the case, the U.S. will need to find niche areas to strengthen ties with Vietnam while at the same time avoiding perceptions of alliance building that counters China.
Continued monitoring of Vietnam's petroleum projects is clearly in the best interest of the United States if it seeks to be a stabilizing force in the region. However, direct engagement in the industry or too heavily with specific countries may be counter-productive and actually make the regional issues worse. Instead, the United States should concentrate on areas that provide support to our partners, but also provide benefits to neighboring countries. Anti-piracy and disaster response cooperation are two areas where the U.S. can help the region while also bolstering its own maritime security interests.
The U.S. government has been clear in stating that it does not take sides on territorial disputes, including disputes in the SCS. 55 Yet, the U.S. also cannot sit by and watch idly as a potentially explosive situation escalates out of control. The key for the U.S. is to find engagement opportunities that show an understanding and respect for regional sensitivities, yet also promote U.S. national security interests in the region.
RECOMMENDATIONS
 Although bilateral strategic partnerships are important to U.S. interests, military-related exercises and engagement should be multilateral when possible. U.S. efforts risk being undermined if some countries, particularly China, interpret bilateral efforts with other countries as the formulation of alliances against them.
 USPACOM should seek opportunities to engage with Vietnam and other regional partners in non-intrusive areas that provide benefit to the entire region. Combating piracy and preparation for disaster response are common interests shared by all countries in the SCS region and can serve as a tool for not only better regional cooperation, but also as a toehold for establishing and/or preserving a U.S. regional presence.
 Recent flare ups in the SCS over oil exploration and fisheries are symptoms of much deeper historical regional and state-versus-state matters. Every flare up in the SCS does not require U.S. action. However, it is critical to for the U.S. to understand how these seemingly minor acts of aggression fit into the scope of much larger national interests.
